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Public Intoxication in NSW: 
The Contours of Criminalisation 
Luke McNamara and Julia Quilter† 
Abstract 
This article traces the history of the regulation of public intoxication in 
New South Wales (NSW) from the early 1800s to the present. We argue that 
although the formal legal status of public drunkenness and drinking has 
changed over time, and although different approaches have been prominent at 
different points in the history of NSW, public intoxication has been consistently 
and continuously criminalised for almost two centuries, despite official 
‘decriminalisation’ in 1979. Shifts in regulatory modalities — including offence 
definitions, police powers, the involvement of local councils and enforcement 
practices — have been associated with significant changes in how the nature of 
the problem of public intoxication is conceived and how the persona of the 
‘public drunk’ is constructed. Perceived at different times as immoral, annoying 
and pitiable, most recently, individuals who are intoxicated in public are 
increasingly seen as ‘dangerous’ and as posing a risk to other members of the 
community. The threat to public safety and the fear that innocent members of 
the public might be subjected to random violence have become major drivers of 
policymaking and law reform in this area, and have produced a less forgiving 
and more punitive approach to public intoxication. 
I Introduction 
In recent years, the problem of ‘alcohol-fuelled violence’ has been the subject of 
intense media scrutiny, and the trigger for a number of significant changes to 
New South Wales (NSW) criminal laws1 and liquor licensing laws.2 Much of the 
attention has focused on the dangers posed by young men who, while drunk in 
public, engage in random attacks, sometimes with fatal consequences.3 In this 
article, we locate these contemporary debates and legal developments in the 
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1 See Julia Quilter, ‘One Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and “Alcohol-Fuelled” as an 
Aggravated Factor: Implications for NSW Criminal Law’ (2014) 3(1) International Journal for 
Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 81. 
2 Lenny Roth, ‘Liquor Licensing Restrictions to Address Alcohol-related Violence in NSW: 2008 to 
2014’ (Research Paper E-Brief No 4/2014, NSW Parliamentary Research Service, Parliament of 
New South Wales, 2014). 
3 Julia Quilter, ‘Responses to the Death of Thomas Kelly: Taking Populism Seriously’ (2013) 24(3) 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 439; Julia Quilter, ‘The Thomas Kelly Case: Why a “One 
Punch” Law is not the Answer’ (2014) 38(1) Criminal Law Journal 16. 
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broader context of the history of the criminalisation of public intoxication4 in 
NSW. A historicised approach5 reminds us that although there is a tendency to 
regard current risks, anxieties and regulatory urges about public intoxication as 
unprecedented, this is not the case. Public drunkenness and associated disorder has 
been a preoccupation of governments since the early days of the NSW colony. 
While constant, the preoccupation has not been static. 
This article tracks, from the 19th century to the present, the ways in which 
drunkenness and drinking in public places have been regulated in NSW.6 We show 
that the criminalisation of public intoxication in NSW has taken a multiplicity of 
forms over time. It has included the creation of various criminal and regulatory 
offences and police powers, and different enforcement practices heavily influenced 
by local exercises of discretion. Shifts over time have been associated with 
important changes in how the nature of the problem of public intoxication is 
conceived and how the persona of the ‘public drunk’ is constructed. As a case 
study of criminalisation as a tool of public policy, the history of the regulation of 
public intoxication in NSW offers a powerful illustration that how a problem is 
framed is an important driver of the choice of policy and legal responses.7 As 
Althaus, Bridgman and Davis observe, ‘[t]he importance of narratives in political 
discourse should not be underestimated’.8 Equally, the construction of regulatory 
subjects (‘public drunks’) is an important dimension of knowledge formation about 
law’s parameters and legitimacy.9 
At intervals (often overlapping), the problem of public drunkenness has 
been variously characterised as one of inherent criminality, morality, race 
(specifically, Aboriginality), class, drug-dependence, welfare, risk and danger. We 
																																																								
4 We will generally use the term ‘public intoxication’ to refer to the primary subject of the article. 
However, we are conscious that the official adoption of this terminology is a relatively recent 
development, and that changes in the legislation language and policy discourse used to describe the 
fact that a person is affected by alcohol (or other drugs) while in a public place (eg ‘public drunk’ 
or ‘intoxicated person’) are an important part of the story of the changing nature of the regulation 
of public intoxication over time. 
5 See also Daryl Brown, ‘History’s Challenge to Criminal Law Theory’ (2009) 3 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 271. 
6 We have resisted the temptation to attempt a national overview of the history of public intoxication 
regulation and drinking in Australia. Although there are a number of generally common themes, 
and although most of the mechanisms employed in NSW have been employed in some form in 
some other states and territories, we believe that the comprehensive and deep treatment that 
jurisdiction-specific studies (such as this one) allow is an important part of the larger agenda (for us 
and others) of mapping the contours of criminalisation: see Luke McNamara, ‘Criminalisation 
Research in Australia: Building a Foundation for Normative Theorising and Principled Law 
Reform’ in Arlie Loughnan and Thomas Crofts (eds) Criminalisation and Criminal Responsibility 
in Australia (Oxford University Press, 2015). At intervals, we will make brief reference to 
comparable legislation in other parts of Australia. We note that Greg Swensen is currently 
completing a major study in Western Australia: see Greg Swensen, ‘Approaches to Managing 
Public Drunkenness in Western Australia, 1900 to 2010’ (Paper presented at the 37th Annual 
Alcohol Epidemiology Symposium of the Kettil Bruun Society, Melbourne, 11–15 April, 2011). 
7 Carol Lee Bacchi, Analysing Policy. What’s the Problem Represented to be? (Pearson Australia, 
2009). 
8 Catherine Althaus, Peter Bridgman and Glyn Davis, The Australian Policy Handbook (Allen & 
Unwin, 5th ed, 2013) 41. 
9 On positioning and knowledge, see Margaret Davies, ‘Ethics and Methodology in Legal Theory: 
A (Personal) Research Anti-Manifesto’ (2002) 6(1) Law Text Culture 7. 
2015] PUBLIC INTOXICATION IN NSW 3 
argue that these frames have influenced the shape of criminalisation in this area, 
but that the fact of criminalisation has been continuous, even during periods of 
official ‘decriminalisation’. Without underestimating the symbolic importance of 
moments when crimes are removed from the statute books, we argue that it is 
necessary to examine critically the consequences of such moves, including the 
nature and effect of regulatory techniques that are deployed to fill the ‘void’ left by 
decriminalisation.10 
This paradox can be explained in at least three ways. First, there is a 
disconnect between the law on the books and the law in practice, including 
departures that result from pragmatic operational (mis)understandings of the law. 
Second, even as the formal status of public intoxication has shifted from 
criminalisation to decriminalisation to forms of re-criminalisation, police have 
consistently been vested with the power to intervene and remove intoxicated 
persons from public spaces. Third, a key part of the story of the ‘evolution’ of the 
State’s regulation of public intoxication is the hybridity of the criminalisation, 
blending substantive offences and coercive police powers. One of the 
consequences of the growth of coercive police powers, in preference to substantive 
offences, is reduced opportunities for targeted individuals to contest the legitimacy 
of police intervention in relation to their presence and behaviour in public. This 
phenomenon is not unique to public intoxication and applies to a range of 
antisocial and other behaviours considered unacceptable in public places.11  
In addition to warranting attention in its own right, the history of the 
treatment of public drinking and public drunkenness by the criminal law and the 
police since the 19th century provides a good vehicle for demonstrating the nature 
and virtue of a wider agenda for grounded and contextualised criminalisation 
research, of the sort advocated by leading criminal law scholars,12 including for the 
purpose of grounding and interrogating normative judgments about 
overcriminalisation.13 As Lacey has explained: 
																																																								
10 Feeley’s classic notion of ‘the process as punishment’ resonates here: Malcolm Feeley, The Process 
is the Punishment: Handling Cases in a Lower Criminal Court (Russell Sage Foundation, 1979). 
Note that being intoxicated in a public place remains a criminal offence in Queensland and 
Victoria: Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 10; Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) s 13. 
11 See generally, David Brown et al, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law 
and Process of New South Wales (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) ch 6. 
12 See, eg, David Brown, ‘Criminalisation and Normative Theory’ (2013) 25(2) Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 605; Ngaire Naffine, ‘Human Agents in Criminal Law and its Scholarship’ (2011) 
35 Criminal Law Journal 51. 
13 Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
2008); Andrew Ashworth, ‘Conceptions of Overcriminalisation’ (2008) 5(2) Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 407; Antony Duff, ‘Theorizing Criminal Law: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 
25(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353; Antony Duff et al (eds), The Boundaries of the 
Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2010); Lucia Zedner and Julian Roberts (eds), Principles 
and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012); Carl 
Lauterwein, The Limits of Criminal Law: A Comparative Analysis of Approaches to Legal 
Theorizing (Ashgate, 2010); Bernadette McSherry, Alan Norrie and Simon Bronitt (eds), 
Regulating Deviance: The Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2009); Dennis Baker, The Right Not to be Criminalized: Demarcating Criminal Law’s 
Authority (Ashgate, 2011). 
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The normative task of criminalisation theory can only be satisfactorily 
pursued if we also interest ourselves in some fundamental explanatory 
questions about the nature of criminalization over time and space. For the 
possibility of achieving valued goals or ideals can only be assessed by 
constructing a clear picture of the various institutional, political and social 
dynamics which underpin the constitution of criminal law at particular times 
and in particular places.14 
Such an approach necessarily involves deploying a ‘thick’ and broad conception of 
criminalisation. This approach does not begin and end with an examination of 
whether the conduct in question is a criminal offence or not. Rather, it takes 
account of what Lacey has promoted as ‘three complementary perspectives’ for 
criminalisation case studies: doctrinal structure, scope and logic; scope and pattern 
of enforcement; and legislative, social and political genealogy.15 
Criminalisation is a rich and complex phenomenon that can manifest in any 
one or more of a number of methods of being on the receiving end of the coercive 
power of the state’s criminal justice institutions and agencies. Arrest, charge, 
conviction and court-issued punishment might still be widely seen as the paradigm 
of criminalisation, but we would argue that these processes may be only part of the 
story of criminalisation in any given context. This is especially so in the context of 
public order — where, for example, the line between the enforcement of 
substantive criminal offences and the deployment of coercive police powers is very 
much blurred, and where offence/power hybridity is also associated with the 
extension to the police of broad and rarely reviewed discretion to decide when and 
how to intervene.16 In particular, the field of public intoxication regulation 
demands, and illuminates the value of, the deployment of a thick conception of 
criminalisation. We will show that there has been considerable regulatory ebb and 
flow over time, in terms of both ‘law on the books’ (creation, abolition and re-
creation of offences) and operation (including the enumeration and expansion of 
police powers that facilitate criminal intervention without charge or prosecution), 
and these shifts have been associated with evolving conceptions of the nature of 
the problem that warrants intervention. 
Two further introductory remarks are appropriate, to locate this article 
within broader questions about social, political and legal responses to alcohol 
consumption. First, the subject of this article reflects a consistent theme in policy 
and lawmaking in relation to alcohol: a preoccupation with public drinking and a 
tendency to treat the negative effects of intoxication that occur in public as more 
deserving of the state’s attention than behaviour that occurs in private. Although 
beyond the scope of this article, this unevenness deserves acknowledgment and 
warrants further research. For example, the effect is that people who drink in 
public — often a product of socioeconomic status and/or cultural preference — are 
exposed to higher levels of scrutiny and criminalisation than those who have, and 
																																																								
14 Nicola Lacey, ‘What Constitutes Criminal Law?’ in Antony Duff et al (eds) The Constitution of 
Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 28. See also Nicola Lacey, ‘Historicising 
Criminalisation: Conceptual and Empirical Issues’ (2009) 72 Modern Law Review 936. 
15 Nicola Lacey, ‘The Rule of Law and the Political Economy of Criminalisation: An Agenda for 
Research’ (2013) 15(4) Punishment & Society 349, 359. 
16 Brown et al, above n 11, 512. 
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prefer, the option of consuming alcohol in private. The most recent phase of the 
history of public intoxication regulation, where there has been a heavy focus on the 
risk of violence associated with public intoxication (rather than mere nuisance or 
loss of urban amenity), also brings the gender implications of this public/private 
unevenness into focus. It is striking — and, we would argue, problematic — that 
the risk of violence associated with private intoxication has largely been ignored in 
recent policy debates about ‘alcohol-fuelled violence’.17 Our concern is not simply 
that a focus on public alcohol-related violence involves an incomplete response to 
the evidence that alcohol consumption is associated with elevated risks of 
violence,18 but that this involves a heavily gendered approach by occluding the 
context in which women are more likely to be victimised by an alcohol or 
drug-affected person: in a private or domestic setting.19 
Our final introductory remark is that the history of public intoxication and 
drinking in NSW (and elsewhere in Australia) is intimately connected with the 
history of the criminalisation and policing of Indigenous persons and 
communities.20 The particularities of this history (such as the creation of ‘dry’ 
communities and the Intervention/‘Stronger Futures’ regimes in the Northern 
Territory), require detailed and localised analysis.21 However, it is appropriate to 
acknowledge that many of the regulatory measures reviewed in this article — 
including ostensibly ‘welfare’-based decriminalisation mechanisms — have had, 
and continue to have, a disproportionately coercive and punitive impact on 
Aboriginal people in NSW.22 A disturbingly familiar pattern was revealed in the 
																																																								
17 For example, the debate surrounding the NSW Government’s 2014 plans (ultimately unrealised in 
the face of Legislative Council resistance) to introduce a raft of new aggravated assault offences 
where the aggravating factor was that the offender was ‘intoxicated in public’ at the time of the 
assault: Crimes Amendment (Intoxication) Bill 2014 (NSW). See Quilter, above n 1, 90–91.  
18 Anthony Morgan and Amanda McAtamney, ‘Key Issues in Alcohol-Related Violence’ in Research 
in Practice No 4 (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2009); NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research, ‘Alcohol-related Crime for Each NSW Local Government Area: Numbers, Proportions, 
Rates, Trends and Ratios’ (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2014); Peter Miller, 
Cache Diment and Lucy Zinkiewicz, ‘The Role of Alcohol in Crime and Disorder’ (2012) 18 
Prevention Research Quarterly 1. 
19 A large majority of domestic violence assault occurs in residential premises (ie in private): NSW 
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, ‘Trend and Patterns in Domestic Violence Assaults’ 
(NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2011). On the relationship between alcohol, drugs 
and domestic violence, see Gaby Marcus and Rochelle Braaf, Domestic and Family Violence 
Studies, Surveys and Statistics: Pointers to Policy and Practice (Australian Domestic and Family 
Violence Clearing House, 2007); Rebecca Macy, Connie Renz and Emily Pelino, ‘Partner Violence 
and Substance Abuse are Intertwined: Women’s Perception of Violence–Substance Connections’ 
(2013) 19(7) Violence Against Women 881. 
20 Chris Cunneen, Conflict, Politics and Crime: Aboriginal Communities and the Police (Allen & 
Unwin, 2001); Heather McRae and Garth Nettheim, Indigenous Legal Issues: Commentary and 
Materials (Lawbook, 4th ed, 2009) ch 10. 
21 See, eg, Sarah Hudson, ‘Alcohol Restrictions in Indigenous Communities and Frontier Towns’ 
(Centre for Independent Studies, 2011); Fiona Nicoll, ‘Bad Habits — Discourses of Addiction and 
the Racial Politics of Intervention’ (2012) 21(1) Griffith Law Review 164; Kristen Smith et al, 
‘Alcohol Management Plans and Related Alcohol Reforms’ (Brief No 6, Indigenous Justice 
Clearinghouse, 2013); Shelley Bielefeld, ‘History Wars and Stronger Futures Laws: A Stronger 
Future or Perpetuating Past Paternalism?’ (2014) 39(1) Alternative Law Journal 15. 
22 See NSW Ombudsman, Review of the Impact of Criminal Infringement Notices on Aboriginal 
Communities Report (2009); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Penalty Notices, Report 
No 132 (2012) 293–6. 
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NSW Ombudsman’s 2014 report on the first year of operation of the offence of 
continuing to be intoxicated and disorderly in public after having been given a 
‘move-on’ direction (introduced in 2011).23 The Ombudsman found that 30% of 
the ‘on-the-spot’ fines and 37% of the charges for this offence involved an 
Aboriginal person.24 
Our discussion will start in Part II with a brief overview of 19th century 
public order-based approaches to the criminalisation of street drunkenness, which 
exhibited a strong focus on the public ‘drunk’ as unworthy, and a blight on the 
streetscape, synonymous with vagrants and beggars, as well as morally suspect 
working class drinkers. We also consider the way in which the summary offence of 
public drunkenness was deployed, particularly in the second half of the 
20th century, not so much as a crime to be condemned and punished, but as a 
mechanism for police removal of drunks from public places, with relatively little 
appetite for formal prosecution and court-imposed sentences. Part III examines the 
move, during the 1970s and 1980s, towards the ‘decriminalisation’ of public 
drunkenness, ostensibly motivated by a welfare-based policy agenda that aimed to 
extricate chronic alcoholics (‘skid-row drunks’) from the criminal justice system, 
which was ill-suited to meeting their needs. Our analysis of this phase highlights 
the importance of a sophisticated conception of criminalisation as a regulatory tool 
that looks beneath the presence/absence of a specific criminal offence to consider 
the range of ways in which a person may come into contact with the criminal 
justice system. Although, with the passage of the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 
(NSW), conduct that was criminal one day became ‘legal’ the next, persons who 
were drunk in public still found themselves the subject of police scrutiny and well 
within reach of the power of the police to ‘apprehend’ and ‘detain’ (albeit without 
charge) by virtue of their drunkenness, or to be charged with other public order 
crimes to which intoxication was a significant causal contributor (such as offensive 
conduct or offensive language in a public place).25 
Part IV charts the rise of local government/police partnerships to prohibit 
drinking in designated public areas from the 1990s, originally designed to empower 
both police officers and local council officers to give warnings and, where deemed 
necessary, to enforce ‘on-the-spot’ fines for minor regulatory offences under local 
government legislation, and later focused exclusively on the power to confiscate 
alcohol from persons drinking in a public place that had been declared 
‘alcohol-free’. Part V considers the late 2000s adaptation of generic public order 
move-on powers26 introduced in the late 1990s into targeted move-on powers that 
																																																								
23 Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 9. This provision, and the move-on power with which it is 
associated (Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 198), are discussed 
in detail in Part V of this article. 
24 NSW Ombudsman, Policing Intoxicated and Disorderly Conduct: Review of Section 9 of the 
Summary Offences Act 1988 (2014) 95. 
25 Julia Quilter and Luke McNamara, ‘Time to Define “The Cornerstone of Public Order Legislation”: 
The Elements of Offensive Conduct and Language under the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW)’ 
(2013) 36(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 534. 
26 Various forms of move-on powers have been adopted in all Australian jurisdictions: Crime 
Prevention Powers Act 1998 (ACT) s 4; Summary Offences Act (NT) ss 47A–47B; Police Powers 
and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 44–8; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 18; Police 
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allow the police to direct intoxicated individuals to move-on where their presence in 
a public place is considered to warrant dispersal, the augmentation of these powers 
with a specific offence of continued intoxicated and disorderly behaviour in 2011,27 
and the introduction of ‘sobering up’ centres in 2013.28  
If the policy emphasis in the decriminalisation era of the 1980s and 1990s 
was, at least ostensibly, to destigmatise public intoxication and ‘care’ for drunks in 
need, the measures adopted during the last two decades have had a very different 
focus, exhibiting a much stronger emphasis on condemnation of public drinking 
and drunkenness and an approach that conceives of public drunks as antisocial, 
dangerous and a risk to public safety.29 Most recently, the correlation between 
public intoxication and violence has been a major driver of shifts in the contours of 
criminalisation. For example, in 2014, the NSW Parliament introduced a new 
offence of assault causing death while intoxicated, which attracts a mandatory 
minimum sentence of eight years’ imprisonment.30  
We conclude that public intoxication has been consistently criminalised 
from the early colonial period to the present. Although the shape and prevailing 
mechanisms of criminalisation have changed over time, there has never been a 
period when public intoxication has been tolerated, or when the police have not 
had significant tools at their disposal to remove drunks from public places. 
II The Crime of Public Drunkenness 
For most of NSW’s history, ‘public drunkenness’ was a stand-alone offence and 
one of the most frequently prosecuted crimes on the statute books. However, in 
contrast to the early 21st century focus on risk and violence, for a long period, the 
predominant motivation for heavy criminalisation was moral judgment of 
excessive drinking (reflecting what Valverde has described as the perception of 
inebriety as a ‘hybrid object’, ‘part vice, part disease’31), and a concern to maintain 
																																																																																																																																
Offences Act 1935 (Tas) s 15B; Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) s 6; Criminal Investigation Act 
2006 (WA) s 27. 
27 Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 9, as amended by the Summary Offences Amendment 
(Intoxicated and Disorderly Conduct) Act 2011 (NSW). 
28 Intoxicated Persons (Sobering Up Centres Trial) Act 2013 (NSW). 
29 We acknowledge that any attempt to ‘periodise’ dominant regulatory drivers risks 
oversimplification. We are not suggesting that a correlation between public intoxication and public 
safety risks only occurred to policy makers, legislators and law enforcers in the 21st century; rather, 
that in this latest period, such considerations became more prominent and influential than they had 
been in preceding periods, with significant implications for the shape of public intoxication 
criminalisation. 
30 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 25B, as amended by the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment 
(Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW). See Quilter, above n 3; Quilter, above n 1. The 
judiciary has also made strong comments about the problem of alcohol-related violence in public 
places: eg R v Loveridge [2014] NSWCCA 120 (4 July 2014), [103], [105]. 
31 Mariana Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) 51. 
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the amenity of public places and thoroughfares by ‘removing’ public drunks 
(particularly, poor and working class men) from the visible environment.32 
The first statutory attempt to specify the jurisdiction of the Court of Petty 
Sessions (the equivalent of today’s Local Court in NSW) — the Offenders 
Punishment and Justice Summary Jurisdiction Act 1832 (NSW) — identified 
‘drunkenness’ as one of the criminalised behaviours. The Vagrancy Act 1835 
(NSW) made it an offence to be a ‘habitual drunkard … in any street or public 
highway or being in any place of public resort’.33 By the turn of the century, the 
offence of public drunkenness was contained in s 6 of the Police Offences Act 1901 
(NSW): ‘Whosoever is found drunk in any street or public place shall be liable to a 
penalty not exceeding one pound’. The offence of being a habitual drunkard was 
found in s 4(1)(d) of the Vagrancy Act 1901 (NSW). 
Public drunkenness was heavily criminalised in practice as well. Sturma’s 
study of crime and policing in mid-19th century colonial NSW shows that more 
people were arrested for drunkenness than for any other offence. For example, in 
1841, 60% of all arrests in Sydney were for drunkenness.34 There were variations 
over time, but arrest rates were consistently high. In his account of the history of 
criminality in Sydney, Grabosky observes: 
By far the most striking development in post-war Sydney was the massive 
increase in arrests for drunkenness. Huge annual increases occurred between 
1945 and 1948, to the extent that public drunkenness offenders constituted 
well over half of the total input to the New South Wales criminal justice 
system at the end of the decade.35 
Grabosky argues that the ‘preoccupation’ of authorities with drunkenness in the 
post-war years was ‘without precedent’, although Sturma’s account of the early 
colonial period indicates a consistent practice of intense policing of public 
drunkenness. Certainly, for much of the 20th century, public drunkenness was the 
most common of the public order offences in Australia, consistently amounting to 
over 60% of those offences.36 In common with many of the summary public order 
offences, especially those which may be classed as ‘victimless’ crimes, public 
drunkenness was utilised by police as a basic street-sweeping offence.37 
																																																								
32 See also Arlie Loughnan, ‘The Expertise of Non-Experts: Knowledges of Intoxication in Criminal 
Law’ in Jonathan Herring et al (eds), Intoxication and Society: Problematic Pleasures of Drugs and 
Alcohol (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 52. 
33 Vagrancy Act 1835 (NSW) s 2. The full title of the Act gives an insight into how the crime problem 
and the targets of policing were conceived at the time: ‘An Act for the prevention of Vagrancy and 
for the punishment of idle and disorderly persons Rogues and Vagabonds and incorrigible Rogues 
in the Colony of New South Wales’. 
34 Michael Sturma, Vice in a Vicious Society: Crime and Convicts in Mid-Nineteenth Century New 
South Wales (University of Queensland Press, 1983) 143. 
35 Peter Grabosky, Sydney in Ferment: Crime Dissent and Official Reaction 1788 to 1973 (Australian 
National University Press, 1977) 133. 
36 Satyanshu Mukherjee, Crime Trends in Twentieth Century Australia (Allen & Unwin, 1981) 82. 
37 David Brown et al, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of 
New South Wales (Federation Press, 1st ed, 1990), 960; Thalia Anthony, Indigenous People, Crime 
and Punishment (Routledge, 2013) 50. 
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In 1951, there were over 80,000 arrests in NSW for drunkenness and related 
offences.38 By 1970 this figure had dropped to 60,000, but drunkenness crimes 
were still the ‘greatest single input’ to the criminal justice system.39 At this time, 
the offence of public drunkenness was contained in s 6 of the Summary Offences 
Act 1970 (NSW): ‘A person found drunk in a public place or school is guilty of an 
offence’. As with previous statutes, the maximum penalty was relatively modest: 
a $10 fine.40 The main point of the criminalisation of public drunkenness was not 
to provide for harsh punishment or to condemn and deter overconsumption of 
alcohol. Cornish has observed that the crime of public drunkenness was ‘not a 
response to the existence of alcohol abuse, nor a punishment of that abuse, but 
rather a punishment of the failure to maintain a public display of adherence to the 
values of sobriety, cleanliness and order’.41 There is a connection here with the 
ideological project of neoliberalism. The discursive construction of public 
drinkers/drunks locates them as ‘costly citizens’ in Wacquant’s juxtaposed 
categories of ‘commendable citizens’ and ‘deviant’.42 Commendable citizens who 
drink ‘responsibly’, and/or in ‘respectable’ (private) settings are not subject to the 
same scrutiny and management.43 There is a relationship also with the construction 
and imposition of authoritative conceptions of what public space is ‘for’. As White 
has noted: 
The form of urban space has fundamentally been shaped by the contours of 
economic development and class-related social processes over several 
hundred years. The very definition of ‘public space’ has been the subject of 
much contestation between different classes, as have the purposes and 
behaviours deemed to be appropriate within any such space. In the 
Australian context, for example, the working-class traditions of using the 
street as a multi-functional social space have long been a source of middle-
class concern.44 
Anthony has pointed out that Indigenous peoples are especially susceptible to 
‘spatial management through criminalization … because of their visibility in public 
space’. 45 The policing of Aboriginal presence, drinking and drunkenness in public 
places has been an important component of the legal geography of colonialism.  
																																																								
38 Grabosky, above n 35, 135. 
39 Ibid 142, 143. 
40 In September 1970, average annual male weekly earnings were $79.20: Commonwealth Bureau of 
Census and Statistics, ‘Average Weekly Earning, September Quarter 1970’, Reference No 6.18 
(1970). 
41 Andrew Cornish, ‘Public Drunkenness in New South Wales: From Criminality to Welfare’ (1985) 
18(2) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 73.  
42 Loic Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Duke 
University Press, 2009) xvii. 
43 We thank one of the anonymous referees for this suggestion. 
44 Rob White, ‘The Making, Taking and Shaking of Public Spaces’ in E Barclay, C Jones and 
R Mawby (eds), The Problem of Pleasure: Tourism, Leisure and Crime (Routledge, 2012) 32. See 
also Nick Blomley, ‘2011 Urban Geography Plenary Lecture — Colored Rabbits, Dangerous Trees, 
and Public Sitting: Sidewalks, Police and the City’ (2012) 33(7) Urban Geography 917; David 
Delaney, Irus Braverman and Nicholas Blomley (eds), The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely 
Legal Geography (Stanford University Press, 2014). 
45 Anthony, above n 37, 50. See also Chris Cunneen, ‘Changing the Neo-Colonial Impacts of Juvenile 
Justice’ (2008) 20(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 43.  
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The value of having the crime of ‘public drunkenness’ on the statute books 
was that it provided the police with a ‘simple’ basis (ostensibly neutral, in terms of 
class and race) for intervening when the presence of ‘drunks’ on the streets was 
regarded as an issue of public order concern: 
The maximum penalty upon conviction was only a fine of $10, but the 
unofficial punishment was really the point of the offence: the fact that the 
person was subject to arrest, detained pending a hearing before a magistrate, 
had a criminal conviction recorded against his or her name, and perhaps was 
imprisoned for defaulting on whatever fine was imposed.46 
The following account by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
confirms that the criminalisation of public drunkenness was very much a 
‘street-sweeping’ exercise: 
The maximum penalty was $10 or up to 48 hours’ imprisonment on default. 
The period of detention varied from case to case and depended on the time 
required for the prisoner to recover. When he/she was considered sober 
enough to be released, bail was granted, usually on the lodgement of $1.00. 
Those who were released were allowed to forfeit bail routinely by not 
appearing at court. In 1978, for example, approximately 80% of 50,387 
cases were disposed of by the offender forfeiting bail of $1.00. Prisoners 
who did not have that amount in their property were kept in custody until 
they appeared in court. The bulk of those who eventually faced the 
Magistrate were chronic alcoholics who were homeless and penniless. In 
many cases, any imposition of penalty resulted in short periods of 
imprisonment.47 
During parliamentary debate in 1979 on the legislation that would decriminalise 
public drunkenness (discussed below), the then Attorney-General, Frank Walker, 
provided further detail on practices regarding the criminal offence of public 
drunkenness in the late 1970s. He noted that once the $1.00 bail was paid, 
[n]o further action is ever taken to bring these people back to court. Of those 
individuals who cannot raise this sum of $1 and appear before a court, about 
three quarters are released without any penalty being imposed. The 
remainder who are fined are invariably imprisoned in default.48 
As will be noted below (Part V), there is a remarkable similarity between 
the practices described here, at a time when public drunkenness was 
unambiguously a criminal offence, and the current state of the law, under which 
public drunkenness is not a criminal offence, but where individuals can be 
subjected to coercive police powers to ‘move-on’, detained for ‘sobering up’ 
purposes and issued with a summary penalty in the form of an on-the-spot fine. 
																																																								
46 Brown et al, above n 37, 974. 
47 NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Intoxicated Persons 1981 (NSW Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research, 1984) 1; see also NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, City 
Drunks (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 1973). 
48 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 April 1979, 4922 (Frank Walker). 
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III Decriminalisation? 
In 1979, as part of a suite of reforms to NSW public order laws, the crime of public 
drunkenness was abolished and replaced with a legislative regime that provided 
police with explicit powers to pick up individuals who were drunk in public and 
remove them from the streets.49 Without arrest or charge, ‘intoxicated’ persons 
could be taken to a ‘proclaimed place’ so that they could sober up.50 In his second 
reading speech, the Attorney-General, Frank Walker, explained the rationale for 
the legislation: 
The purpose of this legislation is to abolish the offence of being found drunk 
in a public place. The effect of that proposal is that public drunkenness will 
no longer be punishable as a crime. The drunken person will no longer suffer 
the stigma of being a criminal. The Government believes this is a long 
overdue reform. It must be recognised, however, that although the crime is 
abolished, the problem of public drunkenness will remain. Some restraint of 
these drunken people must be provided both for their own protection and the 
protection of the community. … Criminologists and other persons in the 
community have increasingly pointed to the futility of processing such 
offenders through the courts and the prison system. The present law is no 
longer suitable to deal with the offence of public drunkenness. A better way 
must be found.51 
Before turning to consider the nature and effect of the legal and practical 
changes effected by the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW), including whether it 
truly did represent decriminalisation, it is worth noting the change of legislative 
language and policy discourse. The objects of the state’s concern were no longer 
‘drunks’ or ‘drunkards’ (terms that are laden with pejorative moral evaluation), but 
‘intoxicated’ persons. The official move from the language of ‘drunkenness’ to 
‘intoxication’ suggested a more scientific and morally neutral position on the status 
that justified or required state intervention if it occurred in public. Despite this 
appearance of a shift towards a more scientific approach, the new terminology 
achieved no greater precision, and the legislation and enforcement practice still 
turned on subjective assessments of behaviour considered to be attributable to the 
consumption of alcohol. 
The Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) ‘replaced’ the offence of public 
drunkenness. The rhetoric around the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) was 
that it was ‘intended to operate on a “social welfare model”, rather than on a 
“criminal model” (as under the Summary Offences Act 1970 (NSW)) or a “medical 
																																																								
49 Similar regimes were subsequently introduced in most Australian jurisdictions, for example, the 
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model” (which could involve compulsory treatment and rehabilitation)’.52 In 
addition to preferring to speak of ‘intoxication’ rather than ‘drunkenness’, the 
terminology used in the Act also departed from ‘the language of the criminal law’53 
in describing the powers the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) gave to the 
police. Intoxicated persons were to be ‘detained’, not arrested, and held 
temporarily in a ‘proclaimed place’, rather in prison or police custody. 
We argue, however, that it would be a mistake to over-characterise the 
welfare credentials of the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW), in terms of both 
the substance and the operation of the new regime. From a definitional point of 
view s 5(1) of the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW)54 provided behaviour-
based criteria for the exercise of detention (unlike the vagueness of the repealed 
‘public drunkenness’ offence). The statutory criteria blended ‘new’ welfare 
grounds with ‘old’ public order concerns. The grounds for detention were that the 
person was: 
(a) behaving in a disorderly manner or in a manner likely to cause injury to 
the person or another person or damage to property; or  
(b) in need of physical protection because the person is intoxicated. 
Only two of these five grounds could be considered to reflect concern for the 
welfare of the intoxicated individual (likely to cause self-injury, and in need of 
protection). The other three grounds (disorderly behaviour, behaviour likely to 
cause injury to other persons, behaviour likely to cause property damage) 
reproduce classic discretionary criteria for facilitating police maintenance of public 
order, which have long been a mainstay of public order laws. This dual character 
was reflected in the Attorney-General’s second reading speech (quoted above in 
the text accompanying n 51), which emphasised that the new regime was designed 
to protect both the intoxicated individual and community safety. We are conscious 
that this analysis runs contrary to the accepted understanding of this period in the 
regulation of public intoxication. In advancing it here, our aim is not mere 
historical pedantry about how the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) should be 
characterised, but rather to draw attention to the continuity of the public 
safety/public order tenets within the history of the regulation of public intoxication. 
This insight has particular significance when we turn, in Part V below, to consider 
current regulatory methods, and surrounding policy rhetoric, which focus on the 
risk and harm of public intoxication. Our point is that even during the period of so-
called ‘decriminalisation’ it is possible to identify the traces of, and foundations 
for, the later reintroduction of a more public safety-focused, risk-oriented and 
punitive model. 
In 2000, the definition of an ‘intoxicated person’ was expanded to include 
‘a person who appears to be seriously affected by alcohol or another drug or a 
combination of drugs’.55 However, neither in the original Intoxicated Persons Act 
1979 (NSW), nor at any point since, has any attempt been made to define the level 
																																																								
52 Brown et al, above n 37, 975. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See now, Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 206(1). 
55 Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) s 3, as amended by the Intoxicated Persons Amendment Act 
2000 (NSW). See now, Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 205. 
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of intoxication required to justify or require police intervention. As we will show 
later, a vaguely defined conception of intoxication, which leaves the police with 
significant latitude to exercise discretion about when intervention is warranted, is 
not unique to the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) regime, but flows across all 
forms of regulation. 
Under the original Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW), the operative 
section of the Act permitted the detention of a person found ‘intoxicated in a public 
place’ for up to eight hours ‘in a proclaimed place’.56 ‘Proclaimed places’ included 
all police stations, all juvenile justice detention centres, and some facilities 
operated by voluntary agencies (such as the St Vincent de Paul Society’s Matthew 
Talbot Hostel in Sydney). 
In contrast to the early 19th century characterisation of public drunks as part 
of the category of ‘rogues and vagabonds’, Cornish has observed that the move to 
decriminalise public drunkenness centred around the idea of the ‘skid-row 
alcoholic’, even though chronic alcoholics accounted for only about 20% of public 
drunkenness arrests.57 The adoption of a ‘welfare’ model, rather than a criminal 
law one, was ‘motivated by bourgeois humanitarianism, expressed either in terms 
of ‘care’ of the unfortunate or ‘treatment’ of the sick’.58 These sentiments were 
echoed by Attorney-General Frank Walker:  
The measures which we propose in this legislation will not in themselves 
rehabilitate. However, they will not inhibit rehabilitation, as we believe the 
present law does, and in many instances they will offer alcoholics an 
opportunity for treatment, care and humane consideration.59 
Removing the stigma of being labelled ‘a “drunk” and minor criminal’60 
was central to the stated motivation for decriminalisation. The shift in language to 
‘intoxicated person’ was consistent with this agenda. However, in practice, in the 
early years of the operation of the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW), there was 
little difference between the ‘welfare model’ and the ‘criminal law’ model that it 
replaced. As Cornish observed: 
Save for the fact that they no longer appeared in court, detainees were 
subject to the processing and treatment that any person detained for a crime 
would undergo. Formal labelling by the courts as a criminal no longer 
occurred, but the process otherwise remained neatly intact.61 
The difference between the treatment of public drunks before and after 
decriminalisation is even smaller when attention is paid to the account by the NSW 
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research of late 1970s practice (see above text 
accompanying fn 47), which showed that court appearances were the exception 
rather than the norm. In fact, a number of commentators agued in the early 1980s 
that, in some respects, treatment under the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) 
was more problematic than treatment during the period when public drunkenness 
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was a criminal offence. For Egger, Cornish and Heilpern, a major difficulty with 
the new regime was that ‘residual ties are kept with the criminal justice system. 
The retention of the powers of compulsion and involuntary detention are dangerous 
in the absence of the protection offered by the criminal law’.62 Cornish elaborated 
on this concern: 
What the Act allowed was detention without trial and without judicial 
review. The behaviour in question, public drunkenness, was still seen as a 
public order issue, and the Act still sought control of public behaviour and 
provided a sanction of detention. … Decriminalization, if the term is to 
maintain some credibility, must at least be equated with a removal of 
punitive actions by the State for the display of particular behaviour. The 
Intoxicated Persons Act fails to match this definition.63 
When the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) came into operation in 
1980, the welfare model was confounded by a shortage of ‘proclaimed places’. 
Consequently, many intoxicated persons were detained in police cells just as they 
had been in the days when public drunkenness was a crime. For example, in 1981, 
there were 43,459 detentions (60.9%) and 27,937 receptions (39.1%).64 This was a 
particular problem for Aboriginal people. A significant number of the Aboriginal 
persons who died in police custody or in gaol during the 1980s — the major 
catalyst for the establishment of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Death in 
Custody65 — were detainees under the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) or 
were arrested for offences intimately related to alcohol consumption.66 
In 1985, the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) was amended in an 
attempt to reduce the use of police station detention, by making this a ‘last resort’ 
option to be used when the person could not be delivered to the care of a 
‘responsible person’ (friend or relative) or to another proclaimed place. By 1987 
the balance had shifted, but there were still 18,294 police detentions (20.3%) 
compared to 71,901 receptions in other proclaimed places (79.7%).67  
The story of the early years of operation of the Intoxicated Persons Act 
1979 (NSW) serves as a reminder, as Brown observed, that  
it is important to look empirically at the actual changes in practice secured 
beneath the general and often misleading rubric of decriminalisation. Even 
when genuine, decriminalisation is rarely a passage from criminal regulation 
to non regulation, absence of regulation or ‘freedom’.68 
In 2000, the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) was amended by the 
Intoxicated Persons Amendment Act 2000 (NSW). The primary obligation under 
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the revised Act was for police to release a person found intoxicated in public into 
the care of a ‘responsible person’, unless this was impossible, impracticable or 
inappropriate. A ‘responsible person’ includes  
any person who is capable of taking care of an intoxicated person, including:  
(a) a friend or family member, or  
(b) an official or member of staff of a government or non-government 
organisation or facility providing welfare or alcohol or other drug 
rehabilitation services.69 
The category of ‘proclaimed places’ was abolished. Only police stations and 
juvenile detention centres (and not hostels or other welfare facilities) could serve 
as ‘authorised detention centres’, and detention was to be used only as a last resort. 
As noted above, the definition of intoxication was also extended at this time to 
include not only the effect of alcohol, but also other drugs.70  
In 2005, the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) was repealed and its 
contents relocated to pt 16 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) 
Act 2002 (NSW).71 Unfortunately, since 1987, neither the NSW Police nor the 
NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research have published data on the use of 
the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) or the Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) pt 16, which means it has been difficult to assess 
either the frequency or appropriateness of the use of these powers.72 However, in a 
2014 report on the first 12 months of operation of some of the latest legislative 
vehicles for addressing public intoxication — s 198 of the Law Enforcement 
(Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) and s 9 of the Summary Offences 
Act 1988 (NSW) (discussed below, in Part V) — the NSW Ombudsman recorded 
police data indicating that, since 2009, the pt 16 powers have been used between 
2000 and 4000 times a year.73 
So, how should the era of official ‘decriminalisation’ be regarded in the 
history of public intoxication regulation in NSW? The fact that under the 
Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) and the Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) pt 16, the police retained significant powers to 
remove/detain individuals found drunk in public means that care needs to be taken 
in characterising this period as one of meaningful decriminalisation. Employing a 
thick conception of criminalisation — which is concerned not only with whether a 
criminal offence exists and is enforced, but also with the existence and deployment 
of coercive police powers — we can see that public intoxication remained an 
active target of ‘criminalisation’ after 1979, as it had been prior to that date. It is 
noteworthy that throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, the dominant rhetoric 
was focused on the need to provide public dunks with adequate care. However, the 
latter part of this period also saw the emergence of a stronger ‘law and order’ 
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rhetoric in NSW policy and law reform debates.74 As we show (Parts IV and V 
below) this shift was associated with an increasing tendency to highlight a 
perceived relationship between public intoxication (and public drinking) and 
antisocial behaviour, ranging from the annoyance and loss of amenity of noise, 
litter and broken glass, to public safety concerns and fear of violence. Increasingly, 
the public drunk/drinker was portrayed less as a person in need of care, and more 
frequently as a public safety risk to be managed. 
IV Bans on Public Drinking — Alcohol Free Zones and 
Alcohol Prohibited Areas 
Only a decade after the formal decriminalisation of public drunkenness, the powers 
of local councils to criminalise public drinking were significantly expanded with 
the enactment of the Local Government (Street Drinking) Amendment Act 1990 
(NSW). The power to place restrictions on the behaviours allowed in public places 
— including the consumption of alcohol — has long been a staple of the 
jurisdiction of the local government tier of government.75 However, from 1990, 
local council restrictions emerged as a significant component of the regulatory 
response to public intoxication. Although they have attracted little scholarly 
attention, we argue that the growth of local government restrictions is an important 
part of the story of the criminalisation of public intoxication in NSW. While the 
formal focus of local council regimes is public drinking (of alcohol) rather than 
public intoxication, there is no doubt that the regulatory focus is the person who is 
affected by alcohol in public not, per se, the person who consumes alcohol in 
public. The aim was to decrease the likelihood of public intoxication by banning 
public drinking. In this way, restrictions imposed pursuant to local government 
powers illustrate an important shift in the orientation of public intoxication 
regulation towards pre-emptive risk management, where public amenity and 
community safety concerns are paramount.76 Importantly, as we will show in 
Part V, this shift was not unique to local government regulation, but was also 
manifested in the approach to criminal laws and police powers adopted by the 
NSW Government from the 2000s. 
The Local Government (Street Drinking) Amendment Act 1990 (NSW) 
empowered local councils to declare discrete areas of public space (roads, 
footpaths and carparks) within their local government boundaries to be Alcohol 
Free Zones (‘AFZs’). This power supplemented councils’ pre-existing power to 
ban drinking in parks and reserves (which are, these days, referred to as Alcohol 
Prohibited Areas (‘APAs’)). During the second reading speech on the 1990 
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legislation, the Minister for Local Government, David Hay, explained the rationale 
as follows: 
The Local Government (Street Drinking) Amendment Bill is another 
initiative of this Government in its continuing commitment to law and order. 
It is a clear statement to irresponsible drinkers that their anti-social 
behaviour on roads and footpaths will no longer be tolerated. The rights of 
the citizens of this State to use public thoroughfares in safety and without 
interference will not be compromised. The object of this bill is to enable 
local councils to zone as alcohol-free those roads and footpaths that are the 
habitual haunts of drinkers. Consumption of alcohol will be prohibited in 
alcohol-free zones, and the police will have various low grade or sensitive 
enforcement powers. … The great strength of the measures contained in the 
bill is the power given to police to intervene at an early stage to diffuse 
situations involving street drinkers before the possibility of more serious 
offences being committed arises.77 
The original legislation created an offence of drinking in an ‘alcohol free zone’. 
Enforcement involved a two-step process: a mandatory warning; followed by the 
option of confiscation of the alcohol or the imposition of a $20 on-the-spot fine.78 
AFZs could only be created after a request from a community member or group, or 
the police, and only after consultation and council deliberation as to whether the 
conditions for the creation of an AFZ were satisfied. Zones were to be time limited 
(originally 12 months) and had to be adequately sign-posted — so that drinkers 
were aware of the public spaces in which alcohol consumption was prohibited. In 
his second reading speech, the Minister emphasised that AFZs were only to be 
declared in discrete locations: ‘I emphasise that alcohol-free zones are not designed 
to achieve, and will not result in, a total prohibition on the public consumption of 
alcohol. They will come into being in response to identified trouble spots’.79 
Guidelines issued by the Department of Local Government suggest that AFZs 
should be as small as possible and caution that it would usually be ‘inappropriate 
to zone the greater part of a town, suburb or urban area as alcohol-free’.80 As we 
illustrate below, local council practice does not always conform with this 
expectation. 
There have been various statutory modifications over the years. The most 
significant of these occurred in 2008 with the enactment of Liquor Legislation 
Amendment Act 2008 (NSW). This Act abolished the offences of drinking in an 
AFZ or APA, so that the only consequence of breach of a ban on drinking was that 
the alcohol could be lawfully confiscated.81 The requirement for a warning before 
confiscation was also abolished. In addition, the legislation extended the power to 
confiscate alcohol in AFZs, previously exercisable only by the police, to authorised 
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council officers. In Parliament, the Minister for Gaming and Racing, Kevin 
Greene, explained that: 
Police and enforcement officers will be able to immediately confiscate the 
alcohol and dispose of it by tipping it out, sending a clear message to the 
offender that their behaviour is unacceptable. This is an immediate and 
greater deterrent than issuing a $22 fine, as provided for under the current 
law. The bill therefore also abolishes this provision.82 
The Liquor Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (NSW) also increased the maximum 
(renewable) duration of an AFZ from three years to four years.83 
Today, the powers to create and enforce AFZs and APAs are contained in 
ch 16 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), ss 642, 632A. The Act continues 
to provide for two separate regimes for AFZs and APAs. Since the enactment of the 
Local Government Amendment (Confiscation of Alcohol) Act 2010 (NSW), which 
extended to APAs the same power of confiscation that apply to AFZs, the two 
regimes are effectively identical in terms of how they are enforced: they do not 
create a punishable offence, but empower the police (or authorised council officers) 
to confiscate alcohol.84 For AFZs the confiscation power is contained in s 642(1): 
A police officer or an enforcement officer may seize any alcohol (and the 
bottle, can, receptacle or package in which it is contained) that is in the 
immediate possession of a person in an alcohol-free zone if: 
(a) the person is drinking alcohol in the alcohol-free zone, or 
(b) the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person is about to 
drink, or has recently been drinking, alcohol in the alcohol-free zone.85 
The alcohol can be ‘tipped out’ on the spot or seized and disposed of by the police 
or council officer.86  
Under s 644 of the Act, a proposal for an AFZ may be prepared by council 
on its own motion, or after an application by the police, a community group 
representative or a person who lives or works in the area. Public consultation is 
required87 and consultation with the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board is required 
for councils with significant Aboriginal populations.88 The Act does not specify the 
criteria that should be used to determine whether an AFZ should be created; 
instead s 646 provides that the council must follow the Ministerial Guidelines on 
Alcohol-Free Zones (2009).89 
																																																								
82 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 13 November 2008, 11451 
(Kevin Greene). 
83 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) s 644B(4). 
84 Note that although drinking in an AFZ or APA is no longer an offence, a person who does not 
cooperate with a confiscation may still be charged with wilfully obstructing a police officer or 
council officer in their execution of a duty, an offence under the Local Government Act 1993 
(NSW) s 660. The maximum penalty is 20 penalty units ($2200). 
85 For APAs the equivalent power is contained in the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) s 632A(1). 
86 Ibid ss 642(2), 632A(2). 
87 Ibid s 644A. 
88 Ibid s 644(3). 
89 NSW Department of Local Government, above n 80.  
2015] PUBLIC INTOXICATION IN NSW 19 
The Guidelines’ statements of the objectives of the AFZ system are 
significant in the context of our attempt to map the contours of criminalisation in 
relation to public intoxication, including the identification of dominant policy 
imperatives. According to the Guidelines, AFZs are: designed ‘to prevent 
disorderly behaviour caused by the consumption of alcohol in public areas in order 
to improve public safety’,90 and are ‘an early intervention measure to prevent the 
escalation of irresponsible street drinking to incidents involving serious crime’.91 
Notably, advice as to the sorts of evidence that a proponent may bring forward to 
support the case for an AFZ suggests that the harm/risk threshold may be 
somewhat lower. The Guidelines indicate that a submission that the public’s use of 
roads and/or footpaths and/or carparks ‘has been compromised by street drinkers’ 
could be supported by evidence of instances of malicious damage to property, 
littering, offensive behaviour or other crimes’. None of these — especially the 
latter two — are harbingers of more serious crime, let alone the sort of violence 
that might legitimately give rise to public safety concerns. The combined effect of 
the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) and the Ministerial Guidelines on Alcohol-
Free Zones is that councils are left with wide discretion as to whether an AFZ 
should be created. As we will show below (in Part V), a similar elevation of risk 
management and public safety priorities, above concern for the welfare of public 
drinkers, is evident in state-wide criminal laws and police powers. 
Section 632A of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) provides an 
equivalent power in relation to APAs. Subsection 4 empowers councils to declare 
any public place (or a part of a public place) to be an APA permanently — that is, 
without duration limit.92 APAs are widely used to ban drinking in areas primarily 
used for recreation — specifically, parks and beaches. 
The power to impose bans on public drinking has been enthusiastically 
and widely embraced by many local councils across NSW. In some cities, AFZs 
are very large. For example, Wollongong City Council has declared a single AFZ 
that includes all streets, roads and carparks in the entire CBD, inner city 
residential and beachside areas.93 In other cities, numerous small locations have 
been declared AFZs. In 2013, there were 325 AFZs and 247 APAs in inner 
Sydney (City of Sydney Council).94 The growth of restrictions sometimes attracts 
criticism, including because the effect may be to force problem drinkers ‘into 
less conspicuous places and away from support services including temporary 
food and shelter’.95 
																																																								
90 Ibid Foreword. 
91 Ibid 5. 
92 An APA cannot be declared in relation to a public road or car park (which fall exclusively within 
the AFZ regime). 
93 Wollongong City Council, ‘Wollongong CBD Alcohol Free Zone 2010–2014’ (1 April 2011) 
<http://www.wollongong.nsw.gov.au/services/community/Documents/Wollongong%20Alcohol%2
0Free%20Zone%20Map.pdf>. 
94 City of Sydney, Culture and Community Committee, Community Sub-Committee, Minutes 
(22 July 2013) City of Sydney <http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/ 
0006/149181/130722_CCC_ITEM12.pdf>. 
95 Matthew Moore, ‘New Alcohol-free Zones Draw Criticism’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 
19 July 2010 <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/new-alcoholfree-zones-draw-criticism-20100718-
10g3f.html>. 
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A noteworthy feature of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) regime for 
regulating public drinking is that it reflects a local council–police partnership 
model. However, it is a partnership with a particular objective. This partnership has 
a stronger focus on managing risk in relation to antisocial behaviour and public 
order offending, unlike the regime under the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW) 
and the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) pt 16 
(discussed above, Part II), where a significant (though, as we have shown, not 
exclusive) objective of the ‘partnership’ between police and drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation and homelessness services was to provide welfare and health-based 
assistance to chronic alcoholics and other drug addicts.96 
Under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), the NSW Police Force plays 
an influential role in the identification of streets that it considers should be declared 
an AFZ and in providing evidence to support the proposal. Section 644A(2)(a) 
require councils to notify local police about any proposals. The Ministerial 
Guidelines go further, stating: ‘In preparing a proposal to establish an alcohol-free 
zone a council must consult with the relevant Police Local Area Commander about 
the appropriate number and location of alcohol-free zones’.97 Under the Act, an 
APA cannot be established without the approval of the Police Local Area 
Commander.98 
Another aspect of the local council–police partnership model for regulating 
public drinking — shared enforcement responsibilities — has not eventuated. 
Under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), both police officers and council 
enforcement officers have the power to confiscate alcohol.99 In practice, in most 
council areas, only the police — and not council rangers — enforce bans on public 
drinking. Many councils have taken the formal position that it will not ask its 
officers to play a part in alcohol confiscation because there are risks associated 
with this enforcement method that council officers are not trained or empowered to 
address.100 
Placing primary or exclusive responsibility for policing AFZs and APAs 
and enforcing bans on public drinking with the NSW Police, however, creates a 
significant resourcing challenge. In its 2007 review of AFZs, the Department of 
																																																								
96 That is not to say that the NSW Police Force has abandoned health-oriented partnerships to address 
harms associated with public intoxication and drinking. For, example, the ‘Last Drinks’ campaign 
involves a partnership between police, doctors, nurses and paramedics that aims to ‘to tackle the 
issue of alcohol-fuelled violence head-on, by challenging the 24/7 drinking culture that has 
permeated modern Australian society’, with a focus on restricting the late night availability of 
alcohol at licensed premises: Last Drinks Campaign, About the Campaign (2012) Last Drinks: Call 
Time on Street Crime <http://lastdrinks.org.au/about/>. See also Julia Quilter, ‘Populism and 
Criminal Justice Policy: An Australian Case Study of Non-punitive Responses to Alcohol related 
violence’ (2015) 48(1) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 24. 
97  NSW Department of Local Government, above n 80, 8. 
98 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) s 632A(8). 
99 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) ss 642(1) and 632A(1). In the case of AFZs, councils must 
apply to the Commissioner of Police to request authorisation for council officers/rangers to exercise 
this power. 
100 See Andrew West, ‘Councils Fearful of Enforcing Alcohol Confiscation Laws’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 1 September 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/councils-fearful-of-
enforcing-alcohol-confiscation-laws-20110831-1jm28.html>. 
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Local Government was told by council stakeholders that although police supported 
the AFZ system, they ‘don’t have sufficient resources to enforce [AFZs]’.101 Some 
councils elect to pay the NSW Police Force to provide alcohol-related policing 
services during high volume public events such as Australia Day and New Year’s 
Eve celebrations, in accordance with the NSW Police Force’s Cost Recovery and 
User Charges Policy.102  
Another challenge for the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) system for 
regulating public drinking is how to ensure that people are aware of the restrictions 
with which they are expected to comply. The regime places great faith in the 
capacity of street signage to communicate and demarcate. Indeed, the Local 
Government Act 1993 (NSW) mandates the use of appropriate signage as a basis for 
the validity of AFZ and APA bans on public drinking. Section 632(7) provides that: 
An alcohol prohibited area operates only so long as there are erected at the 
outer limits of the area, and at suitable intervals within the area, conspicuous 
signs: 
(a) stating that the drinking of alcohol is prohibited in the area, and 
(b) specifying the times or events, as specified in the declaration by which 
the area was established, during which it is to operate.103 
For AFZs, councils must publish newspaper notices when a zone is established or 
extended,104 and erect appropriate signage.105 Because AFZs are for a fixed 
duration, signs must identify the ‘period … for which the alcohol-free zone is to 
operate’ (for example, 1 July 2012–30 June 2016). The Ministerial Guidelines 
provide further guidance: 
A council is required to consult with the police regarding the placement of 
signs. … Signs designating an alcohol-free zone must indicate that the 
drinking of alcohol is prohibited in the zone. Signs should note that alcohol 
may be seized and disposed of if alcohol is being consumed in the zone. 
Starting and finishing dates for the operation of the zone should also be 
included. It is recommended that signs use consistent, easily recognisable 
symbols and include a map of the area defining the location of the zone.106 
Many councils also display maps on their websites.107 
Even if all councils consistently achieved full compliance with the signage 
requirements (informal fieldwork observation suggests that they do not),108  
																																																								
101 NSW Department of Local Government, Evaluation of Alcohol Free Zones in NSW: Final Report 
(April 2007) 13. See also Nicole Hasham and Emma Partridge, ‘“Powerless” on Booze’, The 
Sydney Morning Herald (online), 17 December 2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/powerless-on-
booze-20131216-2zhfk.html/>. 
102 NSW Police Force, Cost Recovery and User Charges Policy (May 2010). 
103 For APAs, see Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) s 632A(7). 
104 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) s 644B(3). 
105 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) s 644C(3). 
106 NSW Department of Local Government, above n 80, 10. 
107 See, eg, Warringah Council, ‘Maps of established Alcohol Free Zones in Warringah’ 
<http://www.warringah.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/general-information/alcohol-free-
zones/alcohol-areas.pdf>; Byron Shire Council, ‘Byron Bay — Alcohol-free Zone’ (18 September 
2007) <http://www.byron.nsw.gov.au/publications/alcohol-free-zone-byron-bay>. 
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the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) regime’s reliance on signage as a type of 
‘silent cop’109 for the regulation of public drinking is problematic. Streets signs can 
be a very imperfect way of communicating precise information and can compound 
problems of complexity, invisibility and ‘unknowability’ that pervade public 
drinking regulation regimes. In a recent report, the New Zealand Law Commission 
observed that ‘liquor bans’ (the New Zealand equivalent of NSW AFZs and APAs) 
raise ‘serious rule of law issues’: 
One requirement of the rule of law is that law has to be accessible. … There 
is an issue with accessibility of the law relating to liquor bans. How people 
affected by liquor bans can find out where those bans do and do not apply is 
highly problematic. The bans are pepper-potted around New Zealand in an 
increasingly large number of areas, but only where there have been 
particular problems with alcohol. … The boundaries of where people can 
and cannot drink in public are not easy to ascertain from signage. In some 
areas, people would not know there was a liquor ban without conducting a 
really serious search for the signage, and at night this can be particularly 
difficult to see.110 
It would appear that the limitations of signage-based ‘jurisdiction’ are not 
the only source of inconsistency and confusion in relation to local council 
restrictions on public drinking. An introduction to ch 16 of the Local Government 
Act 1993 (NSW) confirms that (since 2008) it is no longer an offence to drink in an 
AFZ or an APA: 
This Chapter also contains provisions relating to the creation and 
enforcement of alcohol prohibited areas … and alcohol-free zones … . 
These provisions do not create offences in relation to drinking in public 
places or streets but instead provide for confiscation and tip out powers.111 
It appears, however, that police and council understanding and practice may not 
always be consistent with the AFZ and APA provisions of the Local Government Act 
1993 (NSW). In December 2013, the NSW Legislative Council’s Standing 
Committee on Social Issues released a report on Strategies to Reduce Alcohol Abuse 
among Young People in New South Wales.112 In the context of its discussion of AFZs 
and APAs, the Committee reported that ‘A fine of $20 can be issued to persons 
caught drinking in an alcohol free area’, and attributed this statement to a Police 
Association spokesperson.113 Further, in March 2014 we were advised by a police 
																																																																																																																																
108 Kate McIlwain, ‘Wollongong Alcohol-free Zones Cause Confusion’, Illawarra Mercury (online), 
12 June 2014 <http://www.illawarramercury.com.au/story/2348252/wollongong-alcohol-free-
zones-cause-confusion>. 
109 ‘Silent cop’ was the colloquial name given to a low round metal dome fixed to the road at 
intersections designed to guide motorists making right hand turns, in the way that police officers 
may have done in the early days of motoring when police officers on traffic duty were a common 
occurrence. 
110 New Zealand Law Commission, Alcohol in Our Lives: Curbing the Harm (NZLC R114, 2010) 
396–7 (emphasis added). 
111 Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) ch 16. 
112 Standing Committee on Social Issues, Parliament of New South Wales, Strategies to Reduce 
Alcohol Abuse among Young People in New South Wales (2013). 
113 Ibid 88, fn 426. It is noted that in its response to the Standing Committee report, the Government 
stated that no such offence/power existed, though incorrectly indicated that the date of abolition as 
2007 rather than 2008, following the enactment of the Liquor Legislation Amendment Act 2008 
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officer that police had the power to impose a $50 on-the-spot fine for drinking in an 
AFZ.114 Some councils still display signs that indicate that public drinking is an 
offence that attracts a specified fine,115 and some councils provide warning on their 
websites that persons found drinking in AFZs or APAs can be fined.116  
In a June 2014 newspaper story on the proposed extension of Wollongong 
City Council AFZs, a senior police officer, commenting on the value of AFZs to 
the police, was quoted as illustrating his point as follows: 
Alcohol-free zones are an early intervention strategy to stop the escalation of 
crime ... and they give police an aid to take some action where we wouldn’t 
necessarily have powers. For example, if there’s an area in Wollongong 
where people are drinking in the street, and causing trouble ... it mightn’t be 
trouble enough that they commit any offence but the alcohol-free zones give 
us power to go up there, speak to them, dispose of the alcohol and issue 
warnings or give them a fine.117 
As noted above, public drinking is no longer an offence and, therefore, cannot be 
the reason for the valid imposition of a fine.118 
These examples suggest, at a minimum, that, contrary to expectations that 
changes to the law are immediate and ‘self-executing’, in practice, gaps and lag 
effects are not uncommon. They are also a reminder that, especially in the public 
order context, local police practice is a critical determinant of what the law ‘is’, 
sometimes even despite of explicit legislation to the contrary. Certainly, it is likely 
that, as with all police powers, discretion plays an important part in the 
enforcement of drinking bans in APAs and AFZs. A senior police officer was 
recently reported as stating that AFZs ‘were not designed to prevent well-behaved 
citizens from activities like enjoying a quiet tipple on a picnic’.119 Wollongong 
Police crime manager Detective Inspector Joe Thone said: 
With any of these regulations, there needs to be an element of common 
sense … So if you get mum and dad down the beach or on the foreshore 
having a glass of wine while having dinner, that’s not going to cause a 
problem for anybody and it’s not going to cause a problem for police. You 
have to implement the laws in the spirit of the legislation.120 
Our analysis of the implications of these public statements is that the ‘spirit’ 
of the legislation is to provide a mechanism for interrupting the activities of 
undesirable and dangerous public drinkers, without impeding the public 
																																																																																																																																
(NSW): NSW Government, ‘NSW Government Response to Strategies to reduce alcohol abuse 
among young people in New South Wales’ (June 2014) 3. 
114 Confidential personal communication, 20 March 2014. 
115 McIlwain, above n 108. 
116 For example, the Byron Shire Council claims that the Council’s system of APAs is ‘supported by a 
severe fixed penalty for offenders’: Byron Shire Council, ‘Alcohol-free zones’ 
<http://www.byron.nsw.gov.au/alcohol-free-zones>. 
117 Wollongong Police crime manager Detective Inspector Joe Thone, quoted in Kate McIlwain, 
‘Wollongong Alcohol-free Zones to be Extended’, Illawarra Mercury (online), 6 June 2014 
<http://www.illawarramercury.com.au/story/2334939/wollongong-alcohol-free-zones-to-be-extended/>. 
118 The only available fine in such circumstances is for failure to comply (Local Government Act 1993 
(NSW) s 660), if a person does not comply with a confiscation: see above n 84.  
119 McIlwain, above n 117. 
120 Ibid. 
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consumption of alcohol by respectable and responsible citizens, especially where 
the latter occurs in settings that advance the pro-commerce objectives of the 
council.121 Whether this selectivity (and its embedded priorities regarding 
legitimate uses of public space) is regarded as an acceptable feature of NSW law 
and law enforcement is likely to depend on one’s level of confidence in the ability 
of police officers to make the necessary distinctions accurately and fairly. In the 
context of this article, it highlights the fact that local government imposed 
restrictions represent an important element of the suite of options available to the 
police to deal with public intoxication.122 Moreover, they are underpinned by the 
same antisocial behaviour/crime prevention rationale, and a similar hybridity of 
police powers and criminal offences that has characterised the most recent ‘era’ in 
the criminalisation of public intoxication, to which attention will now be turned. 
V Intoxication-specific Move-on Powers and Associated 
Offences 
In the late 1990s, express statutory ‘move-on’ powers were given to the police as a 
mechanism for allowing them to demand that individuals leave a particular public 
place where their presence was deemed to be undesirable.123 It is likely that police 
officers had long exercised such powers on an informal basis, in NSW and 
elsewhere.124 Nonetheless, the creation of express statutory powers to this effect — 
originally added to the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) and later relocated to 
the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) — was a 
significant moment in what we have described as the hybridisation of public order 
criminalisation, with reduced dependence on substantive offences and greater 
reliance on coercive police powers without the need for charge, arrest or penalty 
notice. A decade later, move-on powers were extended to provide police with an 
additional tool for addressing risks associated with public intoxication. This shift in 
the regulation of public intoxication has been characterised by more punitive and 
less welfare-based strategies, associated with a policy discourse that positions the 
‘public drunk’ not as vulnerable and in need of care, but as reckless and dangerous 
and in need of constraint and condemnation. This trajectory has escalated further in 
recent years in a context of heightened anxiety about alcohol-fuelled violence, 
especially where it occurs in public places.125 
																																																								
121 Some local councils have declared and sign-posted AFZs in streets where they have simultaneously 
permitted alfresco dining and liquor consumption at licensed premises. In such cases, the 
Ministerial Guidelines suggest that councils should impose conditions on the licensee regarding 
‘the requirements of the zone, including clear delineation and control of the licensed area from the 
alcohol-free zone’: NSW Department of Local Government, above n 80, 8. 
122 Whether bans on public drinking are effective in achieving their goals requires further research: see 
Amy Pennay and Robin Room, ‘Prohibiting Public Drinking in Urban Public Spaces: A Review of 
the Evidence’ (2012) 19(2) Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy 91. 
123 Crimes Legislation Amendment (Police and Public Safety) Act 1998 (NSW). 
124 See NSW Ombudsman, Policing Public Safety: Report under section 6 of the Crimes Legislation 
Amendment (Police and Public Safety) Act (NSW Ombudsman, 1999) [10.70]; Brown et al, 
above n 11, 556. 
125 In February 2014, the NSW Government introduced a Bill that would have created 11 new 
aggravated assault offences, where the aggravating factor was that the assault had occurred when 
the offender was ‘intoxicated in public’. The Crimes Amendment (Intoxication) Bill 2014 was 
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In the original incarnation of intoxication-specific move-on powers, 
following the enactment of the Law Enforcement and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2007 (NSW), a move-on direction could be given to an intoxicated 
person who was in a group of three or more intoxicated persons in a public place if 
the officer believed on reasonable grounds that their behaviour was likely to cause 
injury to another person or damage property or otherwise gives rise to a risk to 
public safety. The Summary Offences Amendment (Intoxicated and Disorderly 
Conduct) Act 2011 (NSW) amended this power to allow police to move-on 
intoxicated individuals, and to add ‘disorderly’ behaviour as a basis for a move-on 
direction. Section 198 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 
2002 (NSW) is quoted in full below, to facilitate subsequent analysis of its key 
features (including the statutory language employed) and comparison with the 
public intoxication regimes previously examined: 
198 Move on directions to intoxicated persons in public places 
(1) A police officer may give a direction to an intoxicated person who 
is in a public place to leave the place and not return for a specified 
period if the police officer believes on reasonable grounds that the 
person’s behaviour in the place as a result of the intoxication 
(referred to in this Part as relevant conduct): 
(a) is likely to cause injury to any other person or persons, 
damage to property or otherwise give rise to a risk to public 
safety, or 
(b) is disorderly. 
(2) A direction given by a police officer under this section must be 
reasonable in the circumstances for the purpose of: 
(a) preventing injury or damage or reducing or eliminating a risk 
to public safety, or 
(b) preventing the continuance of disorderly behaviour in a 
public place. 
(3) The period during which a person may be directed not to return to 
a public place is not to exceed 6 hours after the direction was 
given. 
(4) The other person or persons referred to in subsection (1) (a) need 
not be in the public place but must be near that place at the time 
the relevant conduct is being engaged in. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, a person is intoxicated if: 
(a) the person’s speech, balance, co-ordination or behaviour is 
noticeably affected, and 
(b) it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the 
affected speech, balance, co-ordination or behaviour is the 
result of the consumption of alcohol or any drug. 
																																																																																																																																
passed in the Legislative Assembly, but was significantly amended by the Legislative Council. 
These amendments were not accepted by the Legislative Assembly. 
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(6) A police officer must give to a person to whom the officer gives a 
direction under this section (being a direction on the grounds that 
the person is intoxicated and disorderly in a public place) a 
warning that it is an offence to be intoxicated and disorderly in 
that or any other public place at any time within 6 hours after the 
direction is given. The warning is in addition to any other warning 
required under Part 15. 
In addition to the offence referred to in s 198(6) (that is, the offence in Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 9, discussed below), failure to comply with a move-on 
direction is an offence under s 199 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW). 
The first point to note about this regime is that the criteria for police 
intervention in s 198(1) overlap substantially with the s 206 criteria in pt 16 of the 
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), but with 
noteworthy variations. The ‘welfare’ criteria have been deleted and a ‘public 
safety’ risk has been added. Second, the emphasis is on removing intoxicated 
persons from public places — or, more specifically, placing a legal obligation on 
intoxicated persons to remove themselves — with no responsibility placed on 
police to deliver the person into the care of a responsible person (as in the pt 16 
regime). Third, s 198 gives the impression of being a highly structured and 
circumscribed coercive power: behaviour-based criteria must be satisfied; the 
move-on direction must be for specified purposes (to prevent injury or damage, to 
eliminate a public safety risk, or to stop disorderly behaviour);126 and the 
maximum period for which a person can be ‘banned’ from being in a public place 
is six hours.127 On closer inspection of the provision, however, it is apparent that 
s 198 employs language that vests police with a very broad discretion to assess the 
risks associated with a person’s presence in public and determine whether to issue 
a move-on direction. Furthermore, s 198(5) provides a loosely drawn behaviour-
based ‘test’ of whether a person is ‘intoxicated’ that requires a police officer to 
exercise judgment, based on observation alone, as to whether there is a relationship 
between the observed behaviour and the consumption of alcohol or other drugs.128 
In addition, the circumstances in which directions are given — ‘on the spot’ oral 
directions on the street with no requirement to issue directions in writing,129 and 
where non-compliance is a criminal offence — mean that specific instances in 
which the s 198 power is invoked are rarely reviewed or scrutinised.130 
																																																								
126 Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 198(2). 
127 Ibid s 198(3). 
128 The risk of error in the deployment of behaviour-based tests for intoxication was recently illustrated 
by the experience of a 24 year old Wollongong man with cerebral palsy who was mistakenly 
assumed, by a pub bouncer, to be affected by alcohol: Ashleigh Tullis, ‘Dapto’s Mick Robson 
wants disability training for bouncers’, Illawarra Mercury (online), 14 July 2014 
<http://www.illawarramercury.com.au/story/2417177/daptos-mick-robson-wants-disability-
training-for-bouncers/>.  
129 In some jurisdictions, a move-on direction must be in writing: eg Criminal Investigation Act 2006 
(WA) s 27(6). 
130 Under s 201 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), a police 
officer exercising power under s 198 must also provide identity details, reasons and a warning that 
non-compliance is an offence. 
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The use of discretion-laden concepts and tests is deliberate. For example, a 
conscious drafting decision was taken not to define ‘disorderly’. In the second 
reading speech on the Summary Offences Amendment (Intoxicated and Disorderly 
Conduct) Act 2011 (NSW), the Attorney-General explained: 
There is no definition of ‘disorderly’ in the bill. The intention of the 
Government is to impose sanctions against behaviour that contravenes 
community standards to the extent that it warrants the intervention of the 
criminal law. Disorderly behaviour can vary according to time, place and the 
context in which it is conducted. Behaviour that may not disturb or annoy 
others in one instance could amount to a criminal offence in another. For 
example, an intoxicated individual who is yelling loudly and persistently to 
the extent that it annoys others, and who does not cease his or her behaviour 
when asked to move on by police, could be committing an offence of 
intoxicated and disorderly conduct. It will be for police to determine the 
appropriate response according to the context in which the behaviour 
occurs.131 
This change substantially expanded the scope of the pre-existing ‘general’ 
move-on power in s 197 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) 
Act 2002 (NSW), with a consequential expansion in police discretion. The NSW 
Ombudsman has noted that unlike the previously existing move-on power, under 
s 198(1)(b), ‘disorderly’ behaviour ‘is not qualified by a requirement that the 
behaviour is likely to have an adverse impact on a member of the public’.132 
The decision to vest police officers with more discretion occurs in a context 
where there is a long history of police discretion being exercised in a way that is 
unfavourable to Aboriginal persons,133 both in relation to the ‘traditional’ offence 
of public drunkenness, as well as allied offences like offensive behaviour and 
offensive conduct under ss 4 and 4A of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW).134 
The Summary Offences Amendment (Intoxicated and Disorderly Conduct) 
Act 2011 (NSW) also amended the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) to create a 
companion offence for the intoxication specific move-on power in s 198 of the 
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW). Section 9 of the 
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) now provides: 
(1) A person who: 
(a) is given a move on direction for being intoxicated and disorderly 
in a public place, and 
(b) at any time within 6 hours after the move on direction is given, is 
intoxicated and disorderly in the same or another public place, 
is guilty of an offence. 
Maximum penalty: 15 penalty units. 
																																																								
131 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 June 2011, 3135–6 (Greg Smith). 
132 See NSW Ombudsman, Summary Offences Act 1988 Section 9: Continuation of Intoxicated and 
Disorderly Behaviour Following Move On Direction, Issues Paper (2012) 8. 
133 See McRae and Nettheim, above n 20, 529–30. 
134 See Quilter and McNamara, above n 25; Luke McNamara and Julia Quilter, ‘Turning the Spotlight 
on “Offensiveness” as a Basis for Criminal Liability’ (2014) 39(1) Alternative Law Journal 36. 
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Section 9(6) duplicates the behaviour-based definition of ‘intoxication’ contained 
in s 198 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) 
(with the attendant problems discussed above). 
How should this unusual offence be characterised? On the one hand, it 
resembles (albeit, in a convoluted fashion) a revival of the old offence of ‘drunk 
and disorderly’, which was a mainstay of public order law until it was abolished in 
1979 as part of the decriminalisation of public drunkenness (discussed in Part III, 
above). Although it does not re-criminalise public intoxication per se (in that 
non-compliance with a move-on direction is also part of the actus reus of the s 9 
offence), it is the first new NSW criminal offence that is directed expressly at 
public intoxication in over three decades. 
On the other hand, it may be regarded as having more in common with the 
offence of failing to comply with a move-on direction under s 199 of the Law 
Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), with which it clearly 
overlaps. The NSW Ombudsman has questioned ‘whether in practice the scheme is 
sufficiently focused on repeated intoxicated and disorderly behaviour or in practice 
duplicates the existing powers of police’.135 The Ombudsman’s preliminary 
analysis of police data during the first year of the operation of s 9 revealed that 
Criminal Infringement Notices (‘CINs’)136 issued for the s 9 offence ‘commonly 
relate to incidents where police could have alternatively issued a penalty notice 
under section 199(1)’.137 
The maximum penalty for the offence under s 199(1) is two penalty units 
($220). When first introduced, the maximum penalty for the offence under s 9 was 
six penalty units ($660) or police could issue a CIN for $200. In 2014, the 
maximum penalty for the s 9 offence was increased to 15 penalty units ($1650) and 
the CIN was increased to $1100138 (the context for which is discussed below). Both 
the NSW Law Reform Commission and the NSW Ombudsman have previously 
expressed concern about the potential for ‘on-the-spot’ enforcement of public order 
offences to produce ‘net-widening’ and overcriminalisation, and to impact 
disproportionately on already marginalised groups, including Aboriginal people 
and those coping with homelessness.139 
																																																								
135 Above n 132, 10. 
136 A CIN is an ‘on the spot’ penalty notice. Pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Regulation 2010 
(NSW), police have the option of issuing a CIN for seven offences, including the offence defined 
by s 9 of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW). 
137 Above n 132, 10. 
138 Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW) sch 5, 
amended the Criminal Procedure Regulation 2010 (NSW) sch 3. In May 2014, average weekly 
earnings in Australia were $1,122.90: Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘6302.0 — Average Weekly 
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139 NSW Ombudsman, above n 22; NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 22. See also Quilter and 
McNamara, above n 25; McNamara and Quilter, above n 134; Bernadette Saunders et al, ‘The 
Impact of the Victorian Infringements System on Disadvantaged Groups: Findings from a 
Qualitative Study’ (2014) 49(1) Australian Journal of Social Issues 45; Elyse Methven, ‘“A Very 
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In 2012, the NSW Ombudsman noted that the power in s 198 of the Law 
Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) and the offence 
contained in s 9 of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) also overlap with the 
‘welfare’-based powers that are still contained in pt 16 of the Law Enforcement 
(Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (discussed in Part II, above). The 
Ombudsman observed that the approaches reflect very different conceptions of the 
problem of public intoxication and of solutions to it: 
Police have retained the power to detain an intoxicated person under section 
206 of the [Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 
(NSW) (‘LEPRA’)] … if they are disorderly or behaving in a manner likely 
to cause injury or damage, or if they are in need of protection. The purpose 
of this provision is to protect the intoxicated person and other people from 
injury and property from damage … . Given that the conditions under which 
a person can be detained under section 206 of the LEPRA are almost 
identical to those which may be an offence under section 9 of the [Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW)], police now have the discretion to detain the 
person under section 206, or to take proceedings under section 9. This 
presents officers with a choice between fundamentally different approaches 
for the same set of circumstances. However there are no guidelines as to 
when they should select one approach over another.140 
While the legislation and police policy may provide little guidance, the 
government rhetoric that has surrounded the latest shift in criminal law and police 
powers to address public intoxication has conveyed a clear sense of what the turn 
towards harsher treatment is about. Paternalistic concern for, and patience towards, 
the ‘skid-row drunk’ — the focus of the 1979 decriminalisation reforms — has 
been replaced by antagonism and hostility towards the dangerous and potentially 
violent drunk who is regarded as an unacceptable risk in public. Compare the 
words of the then Attorney-General in 1979 (quoted above, Part II, in relation to 
the introduction of the Intoxicated Persons Act 1979 (NSW)) with the words of the 
Attorney-General in 2011, in relation to the Summary Offences Amendment 
(Intoxicated and Disorderly Conduct) Act 2011 (NSW): 
We have said that people are entitled to enjoy a night out without fear of 
having their evening ruined by drunken and violent hooligans. … 
It is clear that more needs to be done to make the streets of New South 
Wales safe again. Sadly, there are individuals who are determined to drink to 
excess or party hard on their drug of choice and then choose not to obey 
reasonable directions given by police to go home before trouble starts. This 
policy is not about targeting the homeless, the mentally ill, the Aboriginal 
community or the disadvantaged in our society. It is to manage the excessive 
intoxicated behaviour seen in entertainment districts on weekends. 
People are entitled to have fun, but not to the detriment of other people's 
night out. Those people are the reason that police need additional 
enforcement tools in the form of the new intoxicated and disorderly conduct 
offence. This State bears the cost of that type of behaviour every day 
through a burden on the health system. Every weekend emergency 
																																																																																																																																
Expensive Lesson”: Counting the Costs of Penalty Notices for Anti-social Behaviour’ (2014) 26(2) 
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140 NSW Ombudsman, above n 132, 14. 
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departments across New South Wales see the impact of intoxicated and 
disorderly behaviour, and the cost of dealing with the resultant injuries 
represents a burden to the State for which taxpayers should not have to 
pay.141 
As with detentions under pt 16 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (discussed above, Part II), neither the NSW 
Police Force nor the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research routinely publishes 
data on the frequency with which the s 198 move-on power is used. Since s 9 of 
the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) defines a substantive offence, statistics are 
collected by the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. In 2013, 453 on-the-spot 
fines were issued and 113 charges were finalised in the Local Court.142 That these 
‘charge’ figures represent only a very small percentage of the occasions on which 
police exercised their powers under s 198 of Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) to move-on an intoxicated person has been 
confirmed in a report released by the NSW Ombudsman in 2014. In the 12-month 
period from October 2011 to September 2012, NSW Police issued 33,580 
intoxicated person move-on directions under s 198 of the Law Enforcement 
(Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW).143 During this period, 
non-compliance with s 198 orders resulted in 2,252 penalty notices or charges.144 
The Ombudsman found that not only was there considerable overlap 
between the different legislative provisions — particularly, ss 198/199 of the Law 
Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) and s 9 of the 
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) — but that police were given inadequate 
guidance as to how their discretion should be exercised. The Ombudsman 
concluded that the expansion of powers/offences in 2011: 
did not provide police with a significant additional tool to manage or reduce 
alcohol-related crime during the review period. By far the majority of the 
incidents resulting in legal action under section 9 could have been dealt with 
by police using the existing ‘failure to comply with direction’ offence 
provision at section 199 of LEPRA.145 
Alarmingly, the Ombudsman found numerous instances of the s 9 offence being 
used in tandem with the ‘welfare’-based power to detain in s 206 of the Law 
Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW).146 The paradox of 
‘decriminalisation’ appears to have come full circle. 
As noted above, 2014 saw a further escalation in the rhetoric surrounding 
the dangers of public intoxication, including a 250% increase in the maximum 
penalty and a 550% increase in the CIN for the offence under s 9 of the Summary 
																																																								
141 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 June 2011, 3135 (Greg 
Smith). 
142 Data provided by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (5–6 August 2014) and on file 
with the authors. 
143 NSW Ombudsman, above n 24, 1. 
144 This figure included 1768 penalty notices or charges under the Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 199, and 484 penalty notices or charges under the Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 9: ibid. 
145 Ibid 5. 
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Offences Act 1988 (NSW). This punitive turn was part of the NSW Government’s 
‘crackdown’ on violence associated with public intoxication, in response to 
widespread outrage and a concerted media campaign following two highly 
publicised fatal assaults on the streets of King’s Cross in Sydney perpetrated by 
young men affected by alcohol.147 The then Premier, Barry O’Farrell, explained the 
increases as follows: 
Alcohol-related violence and antisocial behaviour is not welcome on our 
streets and, frankly, will no longer be tolerated. It is therefore critical that 
police can fine those offenders who do behave in such a manner, and that the 
fine is a sufficient amount to act as a deterrent for this unacceptable 
behaviour.148  
The increased fines depart dramatically from the recommendation of the NSW 
Law Reform Commission that penalties imposed by way of on-the-spot fines 
should not normally exceed 25% of the maximum penalty that can be imposed by a 
court.149 The fine levied by CIN for an alleged violation of s 9 of the Summary 
Offences Act 1988 (NSW) is now 66% of the maximum fine that can be imposed in 
the NSW Local Court. The NSW Ombudsman cited the increased fines as an 
additional reason to be concerned about how s 9 is employed in practice: 
In light of the sizeable differences in monetary penalties that now apply and 
the disproportionate numbers of vulnerable people affected, it is important 
that police uses of the section 9 offence be directed at more serious 
incidents. For this reason we have recommended that section 9 be amended 
so that it relates more squarely to serious instances of intoxicated and 
disorderly conduct, including violent or threatening conduct not already 
covered by section 199 LEPRA.150 
Although these latest developments appear to support an analysis that 
highlights an incremental shift towards more explicit and punitive criminalisation 
of public intoxication during the 2000s,151 we would caution against a simple linear 
narrative. We have already shown that the decriminalisation/welfare model of the 
1980s was not all that it appeared. Next, we highlight an apparent revival of a 
welfare model not only alongside, but closely aligned with the punitive shifts of 
recent years: the introduction of ‘sobering up centres’. 
In 2013, the NSW Government commenced a 12-month trial of ‘sobering 
up centres’, including one mandatory centre run by the NSW Police in central 
Sydney and two ‘accredited’ centres run by non-government providers in 
Randwick and Wollongong. The stated objective of the Intoxicated Persons 
(Sobering Up Centres Trial) Act 2013 (NSW) was to ‘promote the safety of public 
																																																								
147 See Quilter, above n 1. 
148 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 30 January 2014, 26623 (Barry 
O’Farrell). Note that, at the same time, the CIN fine was also increased for the Summary Offences 
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places and public amenity by facilitating a trial of a scheme to reduce alcohol-
related violence and other antisocial behaviour’.152  
The accredited centres were described by the Government as ‘optional’, 
implying that the intoxicated person had a choice about whether they spent time in 
the centre. This was reflected in s 11(1)(b), which stated that ‘admission to the 
centre is voluntary’ and s 15(1), which stated that ‘[a] person who has been 
admitted to an accredited sobering up centre may leave … at any time’. However, 
s 6 of the Act gave express powers to the police to detain a person and take them to 
a centre, if they were ‘in need of physical protection’ because they were 
intoxicated, or if a police officer believed that they were ‘a public nuisance’. Under 
s 6(3), a person was defined as being a public nuisance if the person was ‘behaving 
in an offensive or disorderly manner and the person’s behaviour is interfering, or is 
likely to interfere, with the peaceful passage through, or enjoyment of, a public 
place by a member of the public’. 
The two accredited/voluntary centre trials were cut short in June 2014.153 
The Minister for Family Community Services cited low usage rates and the 
Government’s view that the money involved would be ‘better spent where it’s 
needed on other programs’.154 At the same time, the operation of the police-run 
mandatory centre was extended for a further two years until 1 July 2016,155 and the 
catchment area was increased.156 
Police powers in relation to the mandatory sobering up centre are contained 
in s 5 of the Intoxicated Persons (Sobering Up Centres Trial) Act 2013 (NSW). 
The grounds for mandatory detention under s 5(1) are: 
 the person has received a move-on direction under s 198 of LEPRA 
(discussed above) and ‘persists in engaging in the relevant conduct that 
gave rise to the direction’ (s 5(1)(a)(ii));  
 the person is ‘behaving in a disorderly manner or in a manner likely to 
cause injury to the person or another person or damage to property’ 
(s 5(1)(b)(i)); or 
 the person is in need of physical protection because the person is 
intoxicated (s 5(1)(b)(ii)). 
Section 5(1) replicates the ‘welfare’ and public order criteria contained in s 206 of 
the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (discussed 
above, Part III), and overlaps with the grounds for moving on an intoxicated person 
specified in s 198 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 
(NSW) (above). 
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If a person is detained under s 5(1), admission to the Sydney City centre is 
compulsory.157 A detained person can be released when the person in charge of the 
centre is satisfied that the person is no longer intoxicated or where the person can 
be released into the care of a responsible person, up to an eight-hour maximum.158 
Unlike the accredited sobering up centres for which no fee was payable, all 
persons taken to the mandatory centre were originally charged a user-pays fee (first 
visit: $200; second: $400; third: $600; fourth and subsequent: $800).159 In June 
2014, these arrangements were modified so that only persons detained on the 
non-compliance/persistence ground (s 5(1)(a)) are charged a fee.160 In addition, 
persons detained in the mandatory centre on the basis of the 
non-compliance/persistence ground are issued with a CIN (now $1100) for the 
offence under s 9 of the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) that such behaviour 
represents.161 
These latest developments suggest that the recent revival of a ‘welfare’ 
approach to public intoxication may have been illusory. It was certainly 
short-lived. It is true that welfare considerations remain part of the criteria for 
detaining a person in the central Sydney mandatory sobering up centre, but the 
other criteria (focused as they are on public order concerns), the fact that the centre 
is run by the police and detainees are held in cells at the Central Local Court, and 
the financial impost on persons detained (which may be well in excess of $1000), 
suggest that criminalisation remains firmly embedded as a dominant response to 
the problem of public intoxication. Moreover, the image of the ‘public drunk’ — 
and the related justification for regulation through criminal law and police powers 
— is now firmly associated not merely with annoyance and reduced public 
amenity, but with a very real risk of personal violence.162 This correlation has been 
a major driver towards more punitive and less forgiving forms of 
criminalisation.163 
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VI Conclusion 
Our examination of the history of the regulation of public intoxication in NSW 
establishes that although the formal legal status of the behaviour in question has 
changed over time, and although different approaches have been prominent at 
different points in the history of the State, public intoxication has been consistently 
and continuously criminalised for almost two centuries. In reaching this conclusion 
we have employed a thick conception of ‘criminalisation’ that looks beyond the list 
of offences on the statute books, and considers also the status of police powers — 
which, in the public order context, are at least as significant as substantive offences 
— as well as the all-important question of how laws are enforced and powers 
deployed on the ground. 
In addition to challenging the conventional wisdom that criminal law and 
policing receded as regulatory strategies at the moment of official 
‘decriminalisation’ in 1979, we have also shown that from the 1990s there has 
been an incremental hardening of regulatory strategies and that this shift is 
associated with changing attitudes and policy discourse regarding the image of the 
‘public drunk’. Once invoking pity and/or annoyance for diminishing the amenity 
of the urban environment, people (particularly young men) who are drunk in public 
are now widely seen as dangerous and as posing a risk to other members of the 
community. The threat to public safety and the fear that innocent members of the 
public might be subjected to random ‘street’ violence have become major drivers 
of policymaking and law reform in this area. This momentum towards a less 
forgiving and more punitive approach to public intoxication may have reached its 
high water mark in 2014, when the NSW Government introduced a new offence of 
assault causing death while intoxicated (with a mandatory minimum sentence of 
eight years’ imprisonment),164 and proposed the introduction of a raft of new 
aggravated assault offences where the aggravating factor was the fact that the 
assault had occurred while the accused was ‘intoxicated in public’. It is noteworthy 
that the Crimes Amendment (Intoxication) Bill 2014 stalled in the Legislative 
Council not because these offences were considered to be unnecessary or 
objectionable but because the Government also sought to attach mandatory 
minimum sentences to a number of the proposed new offences, which provoked 
staunch resistance.165 
We mention this development because it provides a contemporary context 
for a final observation we would like to draw from the history of the regulation of 
public intoxication in NSW: the need to reconsider the policy and law reform 
preoccupation with public intoxication. As we observed in the introduction to this 
article, not only does this focus effect the overcriminalisation of marginalised 
persons (particularly Aboriginal drinkers), but it risks undercriminalising the 
alcohol-related harms experienced disproportionately by women in private 
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settings.166 A sound evidence-based policy and law reform response to the personal 
violence and other risks associated with alcohol and drug use is one which avoids, 
rather than reproduces, the traditional tendency to treat criminal offending that 
occurs in public as more deserving of the State’s attention than offending that 
occurs in private. 
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